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Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4388
This study examines the roles of revenue recycling 
schemes for the selection of alternative tax instruments 
(i.e., carbon-, sulphur-, energy- and output-tax) to 
reduce CO2 emissions to a specified level in Thailand. A 
static, single period, multi-sectoral computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model of the Thai economy has been 
developed for this purpose. This study finds that the 
selection of a tax instrument to reduce CO2 emissions 
would be significantly influenced by the scheme to 
recycle the tax revenue to the economy. If the tax revenue 
is recycled to finance cuts in the existing labour or 
indirect tax rates, carbon tax would be more efficient 
than the sulphur-, energy- and output-taxes to reduce 
This paper—a product of the Sustainable Rural and Urban Development Team, Development Research Group—is part 
of a larger effort in the department to study climate change and clean energy issues. Policy Research Working Papers are 
also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at gtimilsina@worldbank.org. 
CO2 emissions. On the other hand, if the tax revenue 
is recycled to households through a lump-sum transfer, 
sulphur and carbon taxes would be more efficient than 
energy and output taxes. The ranking between the 
sulphur and carbon taxes under the lump sum transfer 
scheme depends on substitution possibility of fossil fuels. 
Sulphur tax is found superior over carbon tax at the 
higher substitution possibility between fossil fuels; the 
reverse is found true at the lower substitution possibility. 
In all schemes of revenue recycling considered, the output 
tax is found to be the most costly (i.e., in welfare terms) 
despite the fact that it generates two to three times higher 
revenue than the other tax instruments. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There are a number of alternative tax instruments for reducing atmospheric 
emissions such as carbon dioxide (CO2), sulphur dioxide (SO2), oxides of nitrogen (NOx). 
Among them, the more common are environmental taxes (e.g., carbon- and sulphur-tax), 
energy (or Btu) tax and output tax. Carbon and sulphur taxes are levies on fossil fuels in 
proportionate to contents of carbon and sulphur, respectively. An energy tax is applied in 
proportionate to heat contents of a fuel, whereas the output tax here is defined as a levy 
on the output of a good or service in proportionate to CO2 emissions released during its 
production. Existing studies, such as Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993), Goulder (1994) 
and Schmutzler and Goulder (1997), have compared different taxes for the purpose of 
reducing environmental pollution. Goulder (1994) shows that an energy tax is less 
efficient than an income tax to generate the same amount of revenue. Jorgenson and 
Wilcoxen (1993) finds, among carbon-, energy- and output- taxes for reducing CO2 
emission, that the adverse impacts of the tax on the economy is the lowest in the case of 
carbon tax and highest in the case of the output tax. While comparing economic impacts 
of different tax instruments to reduce CO2 emissions, existing studies (e.g., Jorgenson and 
Wilcoxen, 1993 and Goulder, 1994) consider only a particular scheme for recycling tax 
revenue
1 instead of considering alternative schemes of revenue recycling. A question 
may arise as to whether a carbon tax is always more efficient (i.e., in welfare terms) than 
other taxes (e.g., sulphur, energy and output taxes) to reduce CO2 emissions irrespective 
                                                           
1    Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993) considers lump-sum transfers of tax revenue to households, while 
Goulder (1994) considers recycling of tax revenue to replace personal income taxes. 
  2of schemes to recycle the tax revenue. While an output tax is relatively more expensive 
than a carbon tax for reducing the same level of CO2 emissions, it generates higher 
revenue than the carbon tax (Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, 1993 and Goulder, 1994).  
An important issue often neglected in the environmental tax literature is the strong 
inter-linkage between the carbon and sulphur taxes. A carbon tax reduces not only CO2 
emission but also emissions of other pollutants (e.g., SO2, NOx). This is because a carbon 
tax would reduce demand for fossil fuels, particularly coal and oil, which are also the 
primary sources of SO2 and NOx emissions. Similarly, sulphur tax reduces not only SO2 
but also CO2 and NOx emissions. A question would then arise as to what extent carbon 
and sulphur taxes complements to each other in meeting their objectives. Could a sulphur 
tax be more efficient than a carbon tax to reduce CO2 emissions? If yes, would the results 
be sensitive to revenue recycling schemes? Interestingly, our analysis shows that, in the 
case of Thailand, sulphur tax could be more preferable than carbon tax to reduce CO2 
emission when the tax revenue is recycled to households through a lump sum transfer. 
This is mainly because of the use of low quality coal (i.e., high sulphur content and low 
heat value) which accounts for about one third of total fossil fuel based energy 
consumption in the country.  
The paper contributes into the literature in two fronts. First, it compares 
alternative environmental tax instruments under alternative revenue recycling schemes, 
which is different from the existing practice of ranking of tax instruments under a 
particular scheme of tax revenue recycling. Secondly, it examines complementarities 
between sulphur and carbon taxes to reduce CO2 emissions. It further investigates 
sensitivities of the carbon and sulphur tax relationship, first to tax revenue recycling 
  3schemes, and second to various degree of substitution possibility between energy 
commodities. The study considers four different tax instruments (i.e., carbon-, sulphur-, 
energy- and output-tax) and three alternative schemes for recycling tax revenue
2. The 
revenue recycling schemes considered here are: (i) recycling the tax revenue to 
households through a lump sum transfer (hereafter “Scheme 1”), (ii) using it to finance 
cuts in existing labour tax rate (hereafter “Scheme 2”) and (iii) using it to finance cuts in 
existing indirect tax rates of non-energy goods (hereafter “Scheme 3”). 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the computable general 
equilibrium model developed for the purpose of the study followed by the presentation of 
data and model parameters. Sections 4 and 5 present results from the simulations of the 
main analysis while Section 6 presents the results of sensitivity analyses. Finally, the 
conclusions and final remarks are presented. 
 
2. THE COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL 
 
The model developed here is a static, single period, multi-sectoral computable 
general equilibrium model of the Thai economy. In this section, we present approaches 
and assumptions used to model various economic agents, such as producers, households, 
government and foreign sectors. 
 
                                                           
2   Different countries recycle government revenues to consumers through different schemes such as cash 
transfers, tax credits, subsidy to essential commodities such as food, medicine (Coady and Harris, 
2004).   
 
  42.1 Production  sector 
The economy is disaggregated into 21 production sectors of which 6 are energy 
sectors (see Table 1). Production behaviour of each sector is represented by nested 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions. This is along the lines of 
some existing studies (e.g., Bohringer and Rutherford, 1997; Capros et al., 1997 and 
Bovernberg and Goulder, 1996). The model developed here, however, differs from 
existing ones while representing the electricity sector. First, the electricity sector is 
divided into seven sub-sectors based on technologies used for electricity generation. This 
allows the substitution possibilities between various technologies used for electricity 
generation. Most existing studies, in contrast, treat electricity sector as a single 
technology thereby restricting such substitution possibilities. Secondly, the nested CES 
structure used for the electricity sector differs from those used in the rest of the sectors to 
allow direct substitution between capital and fuel in the electricity generation industry. 
Our model considers the gross output of the electricity sector as a CES function of the 
capital-fuel composite and the labour-material-electricity composite in contrast to the 
existing practice of treating it as a function of primary factor composite (i.e., a composite 
of capital and labour) and the aggregate intermediate input.  
Figures 1a and 1b present the nested production structures, respectively for the 
electricity sector and other sectors. As can be seen from these figures, for all sectors 
except electricity generation, gross output (XD) is a CES function of the primary factor 
composite (PF) and the aggregate intermediate input (Z). In the electricity sector, gross 
output is a CES function of the capital-fuel composite (KF) and the labour-material-
electricity composite (LMEL). The gross output is expressed as follows: 
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g = electricity sub-sector 
where αPF and αZ represent scaling factors for PF and Z, respectively and σ
PFZ is the 
elasticity of substitution between PF and Z. In the electricity sector PF, Z, αPF, αZ and 
σ
PFZ are respectively replaced by KF, LMEL, αKF (i.e., scaling factor for KF), αLMEL (i.e., 
scaling factor for LMEL) and σ
KFLMEL (i.e., elasticity of substitution between KF and 
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σ α =        ( 6 )  
g = electricity sub-sector 
where xdp, pfp and zp are price of the gross output, the primary factor composite and the 
aggregate intermediate good, respectively. In the electricity sub-sectors, pfp, zp, αPF, αZ 
and σ
PFZ are replaced by, respectively, kfp (i.e., price of KF), lmelp (i.e., price of LMEL), 
  6αKF, αLMEL and σ
KFLMEL. The dual functions of Equation 1 and 2 give the unit cost of 
production as follows: 
) 1 /( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 (
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CES refers to a constant elasticity of substitution functional form and CD refers to a Cobb-Douglas functional form, 
XD represents gross output, PF and Z refer to the primary factor composite and the aggregate intermediate 
consumption; K, L, E and MT refer to capital, labour, the aggregate energy consumption and the aggregate material 
consumption; F, EL and M refer to fuel, electricity and material. Similarly, KF, LMEL and MTEL refer to the capital 
fuel composite, the labour, material, electricity composite and the material and electricity composite.  
 
In the similar manner for Equations 3 to 6, all other demand variables presented in 
  7the subsequent tiers of the nested structures in Figures 1a and 1b are derived except for 
the material inputs (Mk). In the case of material input, the Cobb-Douglas functional form 
is considered, mainly due to a lack of substitution elasticities among the material inputs
3. 
The demands for material input in production sector i (Mk,i) and electricity sub-sector g 
(Mk,g) are derived as follows: 
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g = electricity sub-sectors 
where, MTi and MTg are the aggregate material input in sector i and electricity sub-sector 
g, respectively; mtp is the price of MT; gpk is the price of good k, indtk is indirect tax rate 
of good k and α is the share parameter. The price variables corresponding to all tiers 
except tier for material aggregation are derived in the similar manner for Equations 7 to 
8. The prices of aggregate material input in production sectors i (mtpi) and electricity sub-
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3   Despite an exhaustive literature survey, elasticity of substitution between materials could not be found 
for economies similar to Thailand; hence, we could not use CES functional form to model demands for 
material goods. Instead, we used Cobb-Douglas functional form that assumes unitary elasticity of 
substitution; which is a limitation. Nevertheless, the use of Cobb-Douglas functional form is common in 
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The electricity sector is disaggregated into nine sub-sectors as shown in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Disaggregation of the Electricity 
Sector
XDSTG
XDST= CES (XDSTC, XDSTO, XDSTG)
XDHY
XDTH=CES (XDST, XDCG, XDIC)






XDSTO XDCGO XDCGG  
XD represents gross output, the subscripts HY, TH, ST, CG, IC refer to hydro, thermal, steam turbine, combined cycle 
and internal combustion engine; the subscripts STC, STO, STG refer to coal fired steam turbine, oil fired steam turbine 
and gas fired steam turbine; subscripts CGO and CGG refer to oil fired combined cycle and gas fired combined cycle.  
 
  The total electricity output (XDEL) at the highest tier in the figure is a CES 
aggregate of hydro electricity (XDHY) and thermal electricity (XDTH) and can be 
expressed as:  
) 1 /( / ) 1 ( / 1 / ) 1 ( / 1 ] . . [
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  9where αHY and αTH are scaling factors and σ
HT is elasticity of substitution between hydro 
and thermal electricity. In the similar manner for Equations 3 to 6, XDHY and XDTH are 
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where, xdpEL, xdpHY, xdpTH are the average costs of producing XDEL, XDHY, XDTH, 
respectively. The average cost of producing electricity at the power system level or the 
producer’s price under the constant returns to scale can be obtained from the dual 
function of Equation 13; this can be expressed as follows: 
) 1 (
1
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All demand variables presented in Figure 2 are derived in the similar manner for 
Equations 14 and 15, while all corresponding price variables are derived in the similar 
manner for Equation 16. 
 
2.2. Household sector 
This study considers a representative household that follows a five-step 
hierarchical optimisation process to maximise its utility (see Figure 3).
4 At the top of the 
hierarchy, the representative household trades off between savings (or future 
 
4   A similar approach has been used in a number of existing general equilibrium models (e.g., Jorgenson 
and Wilcoxen, 1993a; Bohringer and Rutherford, 1997; Shoven and Whalley, 1992 and Ballard et al., 
1985).  
  10consumption) and the present consumption
5 while maximising utility (U), which is 
represented as follows:  
FCS FCS FCS FCS FCS
FC
FCS FCS FCS
FC S FC U
σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ α α
/ ) 1 ( / ) 1 ( / 1 / ) 1 ( / 1 ] . ) 1 ( . [
− − − − + =     (17) 
where αFC is the scaling factor and σ
FCS is the elasticity of substitution between the 
present consumption (FC) and household savings (S). FC and S are derived from the first 
order condition of utility maximisation (i.e., Equation 17) under budget constraint, 
, as follows:   IF C f c pS s p =+ ..
) . fcp ( I . FC
FCS
FC ω α = σ            ( 1 8 )  
) . sp ( I ). 1 ( S
FCS
FC ω α − = σ            ( 1 9 )  
where  ; fcp and sp are prices of present 
consumption and savings, respectively and I is the full consumption. While the present 
consumption is a function of consumption of goods/services and leisure as illustrated in 
Figure 3, household savings is a function of the price of savings and the elasticity of 
substitution between present consumption and future consumption. Price of savings is 
equal to expected rate of return on investment. Investment is calculated in Equation 38 
later. Note that the summation of household savings, government savings and foreign 
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The full consumption (I) is the sum of disposable income (DI) and imputed value 
of leisure, i.e. 
LS . wr DI I + =              ( 2 0 )  
                                                            
5   The present consumption is the aggregation of goods, services and leisure consumed. According to 
Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993a), this is also referred to as full consumption. 
  11where wr is real wage rate and LS is leisure demand. The price of utility (up) can be 
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Most general equilibrium models are found to use Hicksian equivalent variation 
to measure welfare impact of policy change (e.g., Ballard et al. 1985, Capros et al. 1997; 
Zhang, 1997). Hicksian equivalent variation is defined as the additional income necessary 
to obtain a new utility level at the old price. In terms of monetary value, the equivalent 
variation (EV) due to a policy shift can be expressed as follows: 
) up , U ( E ) up , U ( E EV 0 0 0 a − =           ( 2 2 )  
where U
a and U
0 are household utilities after and before the policy change, respectively; 
and up
0 is the price of utility before the policy change. Note here that the welfare effect 
does not account for the welfare improvements due to mitigation of carbon and sulphur 
emissions.  
In the same manner for Equations 18 and 19, household demand for goods and 
services (C) and leisure (LS) are derived from tier 2 of the nested structure in Figure 3. 
Similarly, the household consumption of the aggregate material good (HMT) and the 
aggregate energy good (HEN) are derived from the third tier, followed by derivation of 
household demand for electricity (CHEL), the fossil fuel aggregate (HF) at tier 4. At the 
bottom tier, household demand for fuels, CHf (i.e., f = coal, oil, gas and fuel wood), are 
derived in the similar manner. The household demands for individual material, CHk (see 
right hand side of tier 4 in Figure 3) are derived by using a Cobb-Douglas functional form 
as follows: 
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where hmtp is the price of aggregated consumption of material goods in households, gpk 
is the price of material good k. 
The price variables corresponding to demand variables in Figure 3 are derived in 
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Figure 3: Nested Structure for the Household 
Sector
HF=CES (CH1, CH2..CHf)
S FC=CES (C, LS)






Level 5 CHEL  
U represents the household utility, FC and S refer to full consumption and savings; C and LS refer to the aggregate 
goods/service consumption and leisure; HEN, HF, HMT and CH refer to the aggregate energy consumption, the 
aggregate fuel consumption, the aggregate material consumption; and the individual goods/service consumption; 
subscript EL refers to electricity.  
  13 
Total household income consists of capital income, labour income and the net 
transfer from the rest of the world. Capital income also includes depreciation. Labour 
income consists of not only salary and wages but also social security benefits to 
household. Total household income (THI) is expressed as follows: 






i + + + + =∑ )] 1 .( . ) 1 .( . [ τ τ        ( 2 5 )  
where kp is net capital price, τ
K and τ
L are capital tax rate and labour tax rate 
respectively, and NTRH is the net transfer from the rest of the world to the household and 
expressed as a fixed portion of total export demand as follows: 
∑ =
i
i i xdp . EX . a NTRH NTRH          ( 2 6 )  
with a
NTRH as a ratio of NTRH to exports in the base case. Household income is subjected 
to income tax (ITAX), which is given as follows: 





i τ + τ =∑
ITAX THI DI − =
        ( 2 7 )  
Disposable income of the household (DI) is total household income less income tax paid 
by the household and is given by: 
            ( 2 8 )  
 
2.3  The government sector 
While modeling the government sector, we assume that government consumption 
does not provide any utility to private consumers. This approach is commonly employed 
in several general equilibrium studies (e.g., Ballard et. al 1985; Capros et al. 1997; 
  14Zhang, 1997)
6. Government collects tax, consumes public goods, saves part of its income 
and receives transfers from the rest of the world
7. Total government revenue (GI) 
consists of indirect tax paid by firms, direct tax paid by households, import duty and net 
transfers from the rest of the world (NTRG), and is given as follows: 




i i i i + + + = ∑ . . . . [       ( 2 9 )  
where G and G
M are total domestic demand and import demand, mp import price and 
impt is import duty. Net transfer from the rest of the world to the government is 
maintained at a fixed fraction of total exports as given below: 
j
j
j xdp . EX . a NTRG ∑
∑ + − =
i
i i i ) indt 1 .( gp . CG GI SAVG
                                                          
NTRG =            ( 3 0 )  
with a
NTRG as a ratio of NTRG to exports in the base case and kept fixed in the simulation 
cases as well. Government income is allocated to public consumption and government 
savings. The government consumption of good i (CGi) is kept the same as before the 
introduction of the carbon tax (i.e., CG
0
i). Government saving (SAVG) is the difference 
between the total government income and the total government consumption, i.e., 
         (31) 
2.4 Foreign  trade 
Import demand: Following Armington (1969), we assume domestically produced 
 
6   It is possible to account government consumption in private utility if its contribution in the private 
utility (i.e., share of government consumption in total household utility) is known. 
7   On the contrary, existing studies particularly, McKibbin et al. (1999), Goulder et al. (1999), Parry et 
al. (1999) and Goulder (1995) assume that government neither consumes nor saves, it rather transfers 
all its income to households. 
  15and imported goods to be imperfect substitutes. The total demand for a good Gi is 
assumed to be a CES composite of its domestic components (G
D
i) and imported 
components (G
M
i) and expressed as follows: 
) 1 /( / ) 1 ( / 1 / ) 1 ( / 1 ] . . [
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where gpi is the price of the composite of domestically produced and imported good i, 
and mpi is the price of imported good i. The dual function of Equation 32 is used to 
derive gpi and it is given as follows: 
        ( 3 5 )  
With the assumption of small economy, the price of imported good is given by 
           ( 3 6 )  
where, gpwi is the world price of good i, and ER is the exchange rate. Note that gpwi and 
ER are exogenous (and fixed) in this study.  
 
Export demand: Following a number of studies (e.g., Dervis et al. 1982; Shoven 
and Whalley, 1992, Capros et al., 1997; Naqvi, 1998), the model considers an explicit 
export demand function as follows: 







ε α =            ( 3 7 )  
where, αi
EX is the share of good i in total export demand and εI is the price elasticity of 
exported good
8 i; (i.e., elasticity of export good i with respect to the world price). This 
export demand function is derived assuming that the world as a whole behave in a 
manner similar to the single country modeled and consumes products according to rules 
of cost minimization subject to the generalized CES formulation that specifies composite 
world commodities (Dervis et al. 1982)
9. Our model rules out the possibility of direct 
exporting of the imported goods [i.e., “cross-hauling” (Shoven and Whalley, 1992)]. 
 
2.5 Investment  Demand 
The model considers that the total current investment demand in an economy is 
equal to the total delivery of investment goods to the economy in the previous year. The 
current investment demanded by the sector i (INVi) is given as follows: 










i i − − +
+
=
σ        ( 3 8 )  
where, invpi is price of investment in sector i; ‘ir’, ‘dpr’ and ‘gr’ are interest rate, 
depreciation rate and growth rate of sectoral production, respectively. Though rate of 
depreciation and production growth rates can vary across the sectors, the model assumes 
                                                            
8   As a price elasticity of demand is negative, ε in fact is the negative of the price elasticity of export. 
9   Some general equilibrium models developed for developing countries (e.g., Zhang, 1997; Xie 1996) 
have used an export supply function by using a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function for 
this purpose. However, this requires estimation of additional parameters. Hence, this study models the 
export demand function instead of an export supply function.  
  17them the same for all the sectors. The model assumes an optimal capital price, which is 
linked to the price of investment as follows: 
) dpr ir .( invp kp i i + =             ( 3 9 )  
Delivery of investment good i (INVDi) is assumed to be a fixed share of total investment 
goods delivered to the economy.  
∑ =
i
i i i INV . ANINV INVD            (40) 
where, ANINVi is the share of investment demanded by sector i in total investment 
demand.   
 
2.6 Market clearing 
Good market clearing: Total production of good i is the sum of the domestic 
consumption of domestically produced good and exported good. 
i
D
i i EX G XD + =
i i i STK INVD + +
i
STK
i i XD . a STK =
            ( 4 1 )  
Total domestic demand consists of intermediate (ZA) and final demand (i.e., household 
consumption CH, government consumption CG, capital goods, INVD and inventory 
goods, STK).  
i i i CG CH ZA G + + =          ( 4 2 )  
Inventory demand for good i (STKi) is maintained as a fixed fraction of output 
from sector i before and after the carbon tax.  
            ( 4 3 )  
where ai
STK is the ratio of the stock of good i to its production in the base case, and it is 
kept fixed in the policy simulations cases as well. 
  18Factor markets clearing: It is assumed that total time endowment (i.e., the active 
population) in the economy does not change due a policy change. This assumption 
implies that the total labour supply to the economy depends on the wage rate and labour 
supply elasticity. Following the Walrasian approach, it is assumed that the total labour 
supply (TLS) in the economy is equal to the total demand of labour in the economy. This 
gives us the following relationship: 
LS TTE L TLS
j
j − = =∑            ( 4 4 )  
where TTE is the total time endowment of the work force in the economy and LS is the 
leisure demand. This implies that people who are legally eligible to work spend their time 
either working or consuming leisure.  
The model allows capital mobility across the production sectors. However, the 
total capital stock (TK) in the economy is assumed to be unchanged as a result of a policy 
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j
j j j − − − = ∑ ] . . [
            ( 4 5 )  
Current Balance: The difference between total value outflow (e.g., imports of 
goods and services) from the country to the total value inflow (e.g., exports and transfers 
from the rest of the world) to the country is defined as the current balance (TBAL) and is 
expressed as:  
       ( 4 6 )  
Macroeconomic balance: Total investment is the sum of total savings comprising of 
household saving, government saving and the current balance. This balance is an identity 
reflecting the Walras law and this equation is not necessary to solve the model. 
  19∑ + = + +
j
j j j gp STK INVD TBAL SAVG invp S ). . ( .
∑ =
f
p , f f n , f p , n ef . c . FF P O L
p , g g g p , g ef . c . XD POL =
∑ =
n
p , n p POL TPOL
       ( 4 7 )  
 
2.7 Emission  estimation 
Emissions of a pollutant p from sector n (POLn,p with p = CO2, SO2 and NOx) can be 
estimated as follows: 
           ( 4 8 )  
where n represents 20 industrial sectors (except the electricity sector), the household 
sector and the government sector; FFf,n refers to use of fossil fuel f (in monetary unit) in 
sector n; cf, converts FFf to energy unit (e.g., GJ) and can be expressed as GJ/$; and eff,p 
is the emission factor of pollutant p for fuel f, expressed in kg of pollutant per GJ unit 
fuel consumption (i.e., kg/GJ). Emissions of a pollutant p from electricity sub-sector g 
(POLg,p) (p = CO2, SO2 and NOx) can be estimated as follows: 
          ( 4 9 )  
where XDg is electricity generation from technology type g (in monetary unit), cg, 
converts XDg to energy unit (i.e., GWh) and efg,p is the emission factor of pollutant p for 
generation technology g expressed in ton of pollutant per GWh electricity generation. 
Total emission of pollutant p from the electricity sector (POLn,p  with n = electricity 
sector) is given as: 
∑ =
g
p , g p , n POL POL             ( 5 0 )  
Total national level emission of pollutant p (TPOLp) is given as: 
            (51) 
  20where n represents 21 sectors including the electricity sector, the household sector and 
the government sector. 
2.8 Policy Simulation 
Introduction of new tax instruments: The new tax, etaxp (representing carbon tax 
if p is CO2 and sulphur tax if p is SO2) is exogenous to the model. Based on the given 
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=            ( 5 2 )  
f ≠ fuelwood. 
where, POL
0
f,p is emission of pollutant p from total consumption of fuel f in the country 
in the base case (i.e., before the introduction of an environmental tax). Note also that fuel 
wood is exempted from the environmental tax. The equivalent indirect tax for energy tax 




envt =             ( 5 3 )  
f = coal, oil and gas 
where envtf is the equivalent indirect tax of the energy or btu tax (BTAX), which is 
expressed in dollars per gigajoule (GJ), and COSTGJf is cost of fuel f per unit of heat 
measured in GJ. Similarly, in the case of output tax, the equivalent indirect tax rates 















=           ( 5 4 )  
p = CO2  
  21Please note the difference between Equations 52 and 54; the subscript f in 
Equation 52 is replaced with i in Equation 54, meaning that a carbon or sulphur tax is 
applied only to fossil fuels in Equation 52, whereas the output tax is applied to all goods 
and services in Equation 54. The carbon and sulphur taxes are direct taxes as they apply 
to only fossil fuels in proportionate to their carbon and sulphur contents. On the other 
hand, the output taxes are indirect taxes and they are applied to all goods and services in 
proportionate to the release of CO2 emissions during their production. In order to 
generate output tax rates, an arbitrary carbon tax rate, etaxp (US$ per ton of carbon 
emission) is used. The value of etaxp is changed until the required output tax rates are 
generated to meet the emission reduction target (here 10% of CO2 reduction).    
The new indirect tax rate (indti
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i is the indirect tax rate of good i in the base case, which was calibrated as the ratio 
of total indirect tax paid by the good (ITAX
0
i) to the total sales of the good in the 
economy.  
Revenue recycling: Three schemes for recycling tax revenue are considered in the 
study. These schemes are incorporated in the model as follows:  
(i) Recycling of tax revenue to households through a lump-sum transfer: When the 
tax revenue is recycled to the households through a lump-sum transfer, Equation 25 is 
now replaced by the following equation:  
     ( 5 6 )  
  220 GI GI REVGAP − =
∑ + − =
i
i i i
0 ) indt 1 .( gp . CG GI SAVG
R L LNEW τ − τ = τ
            ( 5 7 )  
GI is the total government revenue including the environmental tax revenue, while GI
0 is 
the total government revenue in the base case (i.e., before the introduction of the 
environment tax). Moreover, as government revenue is maintained constant, Equation 31 
that represents government savings is replaced by the following equation: 
         (58) 
(ii) Recycling of tax revenue to finance cuts in existing labour tax rate: When the tax 
revenue is used to finance cuts in existing labour tax rates, τL is replaced by τLNEW, 
which is given by: 









          ( 6 0 )  
The government saving is calculated by using Equation 58 instead of Equation 31. 
(iii) Recycling of tax revenue to finance cuts in existing indirect taxes on non-energy 
goods and services: When the tax revenue is recycled to finance cuts in existing indirect 
tax rates of on non-energy goods and services, the new indirect tax is calculated as 
follows:  
f f f envt indt indt
NEW
+ =
ω − = k
           (61) 
with f = coal, oil and gas 
k indt indt
NEW
            ( 6 2 )  
EL EL indt indt
NEW
=            ( 6 3 )  




k k gp . G
REVGAP
 and indtEL is the indirect tax rate on electricity.  
The government saving is calculated again by using Equation 58. 
 
3. DATA AND PARAMETERS 
A social accounting matrix (SAM) of Thailand for year 1990 constructed by 
Timilsina and Shrestha (2002) was used for this study.  The SAM is based on the Input-
Output (I/O) Tables (NESDB, 1993) and National Accounts of Thailand (NESDB, 1991). 
The main parameters used in the model include price elasticity of exports (η) and 
elasticities of substitution between (i) the primary factor composite and the aggregate 
intermediate input (σ
PFZ), (ii) capital and labour (σ
KL), (iii) the energy aggregate and the 
material aggregate (σ
EMT), (iv) the fuel aggregate and electricity (σ
FEL), (v) domestically 
produced and imported goods (σ
DM) and (vi) individual fuels (σ
FF). The values of these 
parameters are based on existing studies and presented in Table 1. Elasticities of 
substitution between electricity generated from different technologies are presented in 
Table 2. 
The elasticities of substitution between (i) the capital factor composite and the 
labour-material-electricity composite (σ
KFLMEL), (ii) capital and fuel (σ
KF), labour and the 
material-electricity composite (σ
LMEL) and (iv) the aggregate material and electricity 
(σ
MTEL) are presented in Table 3. In the household sector, the elasticity of substitutions 
between present consumption (i.e., consumption of goods and leisure) and savings; and 
the consumption of goods and leisure are calibrated following Ballard et al. (1985).  
  24Table 1: Values of elasticity parameters used in the study 
 







DM  η 
Agriculture 0.3  0.6  0.25  0.60  2.0  0.6  2 
Fuelwood 0.2  0.6  0.25  0.60  2.0  0.6  1 
Construction 0.3  0.5  0.25  0.30  0.8  0.2  2 
Coal 0.2  0.6  0.25  0.50  0.8  0.2  0.2 
Crude oil   0.2  0.6  0.20  0.50  0.8  4.0  4 
Minerals 0.2  0.6  0.25  0.60  0.8  0.6  3 
Food 0.2  0.6  0.25  0.60  2.0  0.7  3 
Textile 0.3  0.6  0.25  0.60  0.8  0.7  3 
Pulp and paper  0.3  0.6  0.25  0.50  0.8  0.7  3 
Chemicals 0.3  0.6  0.25  0.25  0.8  0.7  3 
Petroleum 0.3  0.5  0.20  0.25  0.8  4.0  4 
Gas 0.2  0.5  0.20  0.10  0.1  4.0  4 
Non-metals 0.2  0.5  0.25  0.25  0.8  0.6  3 
Metals 0.3  0.5  0.25  0.25  0.8  0.6  3 
Fabricated metals  0.3  0.5  0.25  0.20  0.8  2.0  4 
Electrical machinery  0.3  0.5  0.25  0.20  0.8  2.0  4 
Other manufacturing  0.3  0.5  0.20  0.60  0.8  0.7  3 
Electricity generation
a -  -  -  -  0.8 0.7  3 
Commercial   0.3  0.6  0.25  0.60  2.0  2.0  3 
Transport   0.3  0.6  0.25  0.25  0.8  0.3  2 
Service   0.2  0.6  0.25  0.25  2.0  0.6  2 
Household   -  -  0.60  0.30  0.3  -  - 
a Electricity generation sector is divided in to  seven sub sectors . Elasticity parameters for electricity sub-sectors are 
provided in Table 3. 
Sources: Böhringer and Rutherford (1997); Jemio and Jansen (1993); Goulder (1994); Rose and Lin (1995); Welsch 
(1998) and Zhang (1997) 
 




Between hydro and thermal electricity (σ
HT)  0.4 
Among electricity generated from steam turbine, combined cycle and gas 














Sources: Welsch (1998), Naqvi (1998) and Zhang (1997). 
 
 
  25Table 3 
Elasticity of substitution in electricity sub-sectors 
Electricity generation technology  Elasticity values 





Hydro   0.3  -  0.2  0.01 
Coal fired steam turbine  0.3  -  0.2  0.01 
Oil fired steam turbine  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.01 
Gas fired steam turbine  0.3  0.6  0.2  0.01 
Oil fired combined cycle/gas turbine  0.3  0.8  0.2  0.01 
Gas fired combined cycle/gas turbine  0.3  0.8  0.2  0.01 
Diesel fired internal combustion engine  0.3  0.8  0.2  0.01 
Sources: Bohringer and Rutherford (1997); Welsch (1998), Naqvi (1998) and Zhang (1997). 
 
4. ECONOMIC IMPACTS  
4.1 Tax rates required for reducing CO2 emission to the specified level 
In this study we have simulated economic and environmental impacts of reducing 
CO2 emissions by 10% from the base case
10 through the introduction of each of the 
carbon-, sulphur-, energy- and output-tax options. The rates of each of these tax 
instruments required for reducing CO2 emission by 10% from the base case and their 
equivalent fuel and indirect tax rates were also determined from the simulation. These are 
presented in Tables 4(a) to 4(d).  
As can be seen from the tables, the burden of sulphur tax mainly falls on coal. The 
equivalent fuel (or energy) tax rate of the sulphur tax on coal would be more than twice 
as high as that of the carbon and energy taxes for reducing the same amount of CO2 
emission. The sulphur tax would increase the after-tax price of coal by 299% to 332%, 
whereas carbon and energy taxes increase the coal price by 107% to 132%. This is due 
mainly to the low heating value and high sulphur content of coal used in Thailand. 
                                                            
10   Base case refers to the situation prior to the introduction of tax instruments considered in the study. 
  26Table 4 
Carbon, output, energy and sulphur tax rates for reducing 10% CO2 emissions from 
baseline under alternative revenue recycling schemes 
 (a) Carbon tax       
  Unit  Revenue Recycling Schemes 
    Scheme 1  Scheme 2  Scheme 3 
Carbon tax rate (US$/tC) Æ 40.00 41.87  44.57
Equivalent sales or indirect tax on fuels (in terms of physical quantity) 
Coal US$/ton  12.01 12.57  13.38
Oil US$/barrel  4.45 4.66  4.96
Gas   US$/'000 cu.ft  0.61 0.64  0.69
Equivalent indirect tax rates (in terms of percentage of fuel price) 
Coal %  118 124  132
Oil %  23 24  25
Gas   %  31 32  34
 
 (b) Output tax rates (%)          
Good/Service  Revenue Recycling Schemes 
   Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3
  Agricultural  1.8 2.0 2.3
  Fuel wood  0.2 0.2 0.2
  Construction  0.5 0.6 0.7
  Coal  3.5 3.9 4.6
  Crude oil   1.5 1.7 2.0
  Minerals  2.9 3.3 3.9
  Food  0.7 0.8 0.9
  Textile  0.5 0.6 0.7
  Pulp & Paper  0.6 0.7 0.9
  Chemicals  1.3 1.5 1.8
  Petroleum  3.5 4.0 4.7
  Gas  7.2 8.1 9.6
  Non metals  5.6 6.4 7.5
  Metals  0.5 0.6 0.7
  Fabricated metals  0.3 0.4 0.5
  Electrical machinery  0.2 0.3 0.3
  Other manufacturing goods  0.3 0.4 0.4
  Electricity  51.8 58.6 69.1
  Commercial  0.4 0.5 0.6
  Transport  13.6 15.3 18.1




  27(Table 4 Continued) 
 
 (c) Energy tax       
  Unit  Revenue Recycling Schemes 
     Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 
Energy tax rates 
GJ US$/GJ  1.13 1.19 1.28 
Equivalent sales or indirect tax on fuels (in terms of physical quantity) 
Coal US$/ton  12.37 13.09 14.07 
Oil US$/barrel  6.66 7.05 7.58 
Gas  US$/'000 cu.ft  1.2 1.28 1.37 
Equivalent indirect tax rates (in terms of percentage of fuel price) 
Coal %  107 114 122 
Oil %  26 28 30 
Gas  %  49 52 56 
 
 
(d) Sulphur tax       
  Unit  Revenue Recycling Schemes 
     Scheme 1 Scheme 2 Scheme 3 
Sulphur tax rates 
SO2 US$/tSO2 671.00 701.90 746.80 
Equivalent sales or indirect tax on fuels (in terms of physical quantity) 
Coal US$/ton  28.15 29.45 31.33 
Oil US$/barrel  3.12 3.26 3.47 
Gas  US$/'000 cu.ft.  Negligible Negligible Negligible 
Equivalent indirect tax rates (in terms of percentage of fuel price) 
Coal %  299 312 332 
Oil %  17 17 18 
Gas  %  Negligible Negligible Negligible 
 
  The burden of energy tax on oil is higher than that of the carbon and sulphur 
taxes. Note that, for each type of tax (i.e., carbon-, output-, energy- and sulphur-tax), the 
tax rate would vary with the revenue recycling schemes. In order to reduce the same level 
of CO2 emissions, the required tax rates are found to be higher under the revenue 
recycling Scheme 3 (i.e., when the tax revenue is recycled to finance cuts in indirect taxes 
on non-energy goods) than those under the other schemes of revenue recycling. On the 
other hand, the required tax rate is found to be smallest under the revenue recycling 
  28Scheme 1 (i.e., when the tax revenue is recycled to household through a lump-sum 
transfer). 
If an output tax is imposed in proportionate to the carbon intensity of a good or 
service (i.e., money value of total production of the good or service from a sector divided 
by total carbon emission released from the sector), some sectors, especially the fuel 
intensive ones (i.e., power and transport), would face higher tax rates than others. In 
order to reduce national CO2 emission by 10% from that in the base case, the required 
output tax rates would be as high as 52% to 69% for electricity and 14% to 18% for 
transport services in Thailand.  
 
4.2 Impacts of the alternative tax instruments on economic welfare 
The impacts of the alternative tax instruments on economic welfare are presented 
in Figure 4. As can be seen from the figure, among the tax instruments considered, the 
output tax would result in the highest welfare loss under each of the revenue recycling 
schemes. This is because while carbon- and sulphur-taxes affect the sources of emissions 
(i.e., consumption of fossil fuels) directly, the output tax affects indirectly. A tax 
instrument that affects sources of emissions indirectly is inefficient as compared to that 
affects directly (Cropper and Oates, 1992; Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, 1993; Schmutzler 
and Goulder, 1997). 
The study reveals an interesting relationship between carbon and sulphur taxes while 
reducing CO2 emissions. A sulphur tax applied to reduce 10% of CO2 emissions was 
found to reduce 20% of SO2 reduction from the base case. Moreover, the sulphur tax was 
found slightly efficient even than the carbon tax to reduce CO2 emission when the tax 
  29revenue is recycled to households through a lump-sum transfer (i.e., Scheme 1). A 
question can, however, arise: why should the sulphur tax be more efficient than the 
carbon tax to reduce CO2 emission when the tax revenue is recycled through a lump-sum 
transfer to households? An intuitive reason behind this is that the excess burden of SO2 
tax falls mainly on coal, which has a limited use in the economy (mainly for power 
generation). This implies that the regressive impacts of SO2 tax get distributed to the 
economy to a lower extent than the regressive impacts of CO2 tax do. 
 
Figure 4: Welfare impacts of carbon-, output-, energy- and sulphur taxes for 










































To clarify further why SO2 tax burden falls mainly on coal, we need to look at the 
quality of coal used in Thailand. Ninety eight percent of coal used in Thailand is lignite, 
which has high sulphur content (i.e., 5.5%) and low heat value (i.e., 11MJ/kg) (DEDP, 
2000). The sulphur content of coal in Thailand is about five times as high as that of oil 
(i.e., the weighted average value of all petroleum products used in Thailand) while the 
carbon content of coal is about 1.5 times that of oil for the same amount of heat release. 
  30This clearly implies that the sulphur tax would cause a larger reduction in coal 
consumption than an equivalent carbon tax. Our model results show that a SO2 tax 
introduced to reduce CO2 emission by 10% from the baseline causes demand for coal to 
decrease by 47%, whereas a CO2 tax for the same purpose causes demand for coal to 
decrease by 29%. Moreover, the SO2 tax causes demand for natural gas to increase by 4% 
as natural gas, a fuel with negligible sulphur contents, becomes relatively cheaper with 
the sulphur tax as compared to coal and petroleum products. The CO2 tax on the other 
hand causes demand for natural gas to decrease by 13%.  
  Note that the base year of the CGE model used for this analysis is 1990. 
Sulphur control technologies were not used in Thailand in 1990. If sulphur control 
technologies existed, the capital costs of the industries employing sulphur control 
technologies would have been higher than that taken in the study (i.e., in the absence of 
sulphur control technologies). It is also possible to model sulphur control technologies 
and sulphur tax under the CGE in the similar manner as Conrad and Schmidt (1998), 
Edwards and Hutton (1999) modeled emission abatement technologies. This could be an 
area of further extension of the study. This analysis has, however, an explicit objective of 
examining effects of carbon- and sulphur- energy- and output-taxes in reducing CO2 
emissions in an environment where no control technologies exists for reducing carbon 
and sulphur emissions and where electricity sector (i.e., one of the main sources of 
emissions) uses a low quality coal (i.e., lignite) for power generation).  
The increase of natural gas demand due to sulphur tax implies that coal would be 
replaced with natural gas when a sulphur tax is introduced. One might wonder would the 
result (i.e., sulphur tax is more efficient than a carbon tax to reduce CO2 emissions when 
  31tax revenue is recycled to households through a lump-sum transfer) holds, if the 
substitution possibility between fossil fuels is small in the short-run? To answer this 
query, we conducted a sensitivity analysis reducing elasticity of substitution between 
fossil fuels. If elasticities of substitution between fossil fuels are lowered by 25%, the 
result does not hold. The welfare loss of sulphur tax is now slightly higher than that of the 
carbon tax (please Table 7). In practice, however, there exists a high substitution 
possibility between coal and natural gas in Thailand. This is because coal and gas are 
used mainly for power generation in the country. In the absence of a sulphur tax, gas is 
used for mainly peaking generation and the utilization of gas fired power plants is low. If 
a sulphur tax is introduced, natural gas now becomes relatively cheaper than coal. 
Existing gas-fired power plants could now be run for longer hours than before (increased 
utilization factor). Hence, the finding that sulphur tax would be more efficient than 
carbon tax in reducing CO2 emissions when tax revenue is recycled to households 
through a lump-sum transfer holds true in Thailand. 
A sulphur tax can be considered an effective instrument in reducing CO2 emissions 
in Thailand for two reasons. First it reduces SO2 emission significantly higher than a 
carbon tax does (please see Table 6). Secondly, it could be less regressive than a carbon 
tax to reduce CO2 emission. Most importantly, it could be an effective policy tool to 
reduce CO2 emissions in countries like Thailand, which does not have binding obligation 
to reduce CO2 emission but has been seriously affected by SO2 emission. In such 
situation, SO2 tax could be a policy choice as it reduces the local air pollution (e.g., SO2) 
and also reduces CO2 emission at almost the same level an equivalent carbon tax does.  
The efficiency of a tax instrument is significantly influenced by the scheme of 
  32recycling tax revenue. When the revenues are recycled to finance cuts in either labour tax 
rate (Scheme 2) or indirect tax rates of non-energy goods (Scheme 3), the carbon tax is 
found to be the most efficient instrument for reducing CO2 emission to the specified 
level. The sulphur tax is found to be more costly than not only the carbon tax but also the 
energy tax when the tax revenues are recycled to finance cuts in indirect tax rates of non-
energy goods. The reason for this is as follows: when the tax revenues are recycled to 
households in a lump-sum manner there would be only the tax-interaction effect, but not 
the revenue recycling effect
11. 
On the other hand, the revenue recycling would have a significant effect on 
economic welfare when the tax revenues are recycled to finance cuts in either the labour 
tax rate or indirect tax rates of non-energy goods (Schemes 2 and 3)
12. Note also that the 
tax revenue from the sulphur tax would be smaller than that from the carbon tax as the 
former affects only coal and a few petroleum products (e.g., diesel and fuel oil), whereas 
the latter affects all types of fossil fuels (i.e., coal, gas and oil). Since, carbon tax revenue 
is higher than the sulphur tax revenue for reducing the same level of CO2 emission, the 
revenue recycling effect of the carbon tax on welfare would be higher than that of the 
sulphur tax. Hence, the carbon tax would cause a smaller welfare loss than the sulphur 
                                                            
11   According to Parry et al. (1999), when an environmental tax is introduced in a system where 
distortionary taxes are already present (i.e., the second best setting), it would further increase the tax 
distortions thereby producing a negative welfare impact; the effect is termed as the tax interaction 
effect. If the revenue generated from the new tax is recycled to finance cuts in pre-existing distortionary 
tax rates, it would cause positive welfare impacts; this effect is termed as revenue-recycling effect. 
12   This is why welfare loss is lower under the revenue recycling Schemes 2 and 3 than that under Scheme 
1. 
  33tax to achieve a particular level of CO2 emission reduction when the tax revenues are 
recycled to finance cuts in either labour tax rate or indirect tax rates of non-energy goods. 
Although tax revenues under the output tax would be 2 to 3 times higher than that under 
the carbon- and sulphur-taxes, the revenue recycling effect would not be enough to 
significantly offset the tax interaction effects in the case of the output tax. As a result, 
there would be higher welfare loss due to the output tax.  
Although the output tax is inefficient as compared to carbon-, sulphur- and 
energy- taxes to reduce CO2 emissions, this type of tax instrument could be useful to 
penalize production of carbon intensive goods from industrialized countries not ratifying 
the Kyoto Protocol (Goh, 2004). For example, output tax imposed on U.S. and Australian 
goods by European countries, Japan and Canada could help reduce CO2 emissions to 
some extent.  
Note that the energy tax would result in a higher welfare cost than the carbon- and 
sulphur-taxes under each of the revenue recycling schemes, except when the tax revenues 
are recycled to finance cuts in indirect tax rates of non-energy goods (Scheme 3). This is 
because, for a particular level of CO2 emission reduction, there would a proportionately 
higher rise in prices of relatively low carbon content fuels (i.e., oil and gas) under an 
energy tax than that under the carbon- and sulphur-taxes. Consequently, the energy tax 
would cause more economic distortions than the carbon and sulphur taxes for reducing 
the same level of CO2 emission. Similar findings are also reported by some existing 
studies [See e.g., Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993) and Goulder (1994)]. However, it is 
interesting to note here that, in order to reduce the same level of CO2 emission, there 
would be a smaller welfare loss under the energy tax than that under the sulphur tax when 
  34tax revenue is used to finance indirect tax rates of non-energy goods. This is because the 
revenue recycling effect of the energy tax on welfare would be higher than that of the 
sulphur tax when the tax revenues are recycled to finance cuts in indirect taxes on non-
energy goods.  
 
4.3 Impacts on GDP 
 
The impact of different tax instruments on gross domestic product (GDP) is presented in 
Figure 5. As can be seen from the figure, GDP would increase with carbon, output and 
energy taxes under the revenue recycling Scheme 2, whereas it would decrease with all 
tax instruments under Schemes 1 and 3
13.  
The output tax would cause the highest changes in GDP followed by the energy 
tax under all revenue recycling schemes except Scheme 3. It is interesting to note that the 
GDP would be higher in the case of the output and energy taxes than in the cases of 
carbon and sulfur taxes when the tax revenue is recycled to finance cuts in existing 
indirect tax rates on non-energy goods. This is because the former would generate 
significantly higher tax revenues than the latter. As tax revenues are recycled to cut 
existing indirect tax rates on non-energy goods, higher the amount of revenues, the higher 
                                                            
13 Under the first scheme of revenue recycling, a decrease in gross fixed capital formation is mainly 
responsible for the decrease in GDP. Under revenue recycling Schemes 2 and 3, the changes in GDP are 
mainly influenced by changes in net export. Net export, which is negative in the base case, increases (i.e., 
become less negative with increase in export and decrease in import) under the revenue recycling Scheme 
2 thereby increasing GDP, whereas net exports decreases under the revenue recycling Scheme 3 causing 
GDP to decrease.  
  35would be the level of cuts in indirect tax rates. This results in reductions in input costs of 
non-energy goods in production sectors. Final demand for goods and services would be 
higher in the case of output and energy taxes than in the cases of carbon and sulfur tax 
under the tax revenue recycling Scheme 3. The higher final demand in the cases of output 
and energy taxes than in cases of carbon and sulfur tax would result in higher GDP in the 
former cases than that in the latter. Since, tax revenue would be lowest under the sulfur 
tax among the tax instruments considered here, the revenue recycling effects would be 
weaker in the case of sulfur tax as compared to other tax instruments. This is the reasons 
as to why GDP is found to be lowest in the case of sulfur tax under the tax revenue 
recycling Scheme 3.  
 
Figure 4: GDP impacts of carbon-, output-, energy- and sulphur taxes for reducing 















































  364.4 Revenue Implications of Different Tax Instruments  
 
We have mentioned in the preceding sub-sections that output- and energy-taxes 
could generate much higher revenues as compared to carbon- and sulfur-taxes (please see 
Table 5). As can be seen from Table 5, in the base case (i.e., before the introduction of 
new taxes), existing indirect taxes (i.e., sales tax and import duties) account for 72.4% of 
the total government revenue, while the existing direct taxes (i.e., capital and labor taxes) 
account for 26.5%. Introduction of a new tax erodes tax base of the existing taxes. The 
rate of erosion depends on the type of the new tax and the scheme of recycling the new 
tax revenue. For example, under the revenue recycling Scheme 1, the sulfur tax would 
cause revenues from the existing indirect taxes to fall by about 5%, while the output tax 
would cause about 14%. Note, however, that reductions in the existing tax revenues 
under revenue recycling Schemes 2 and 3 are not only due to the tax base erosion, but 
also due to their substitution by new tax revenues.  
The output tax revenue could substitute existing direct tax revenues up to 20% 
(from 26.45% to 6.48% under Scheme 2) thereby keeping the total government revenue 
to the same level as before the introduction of the output tax. The sulfur tax revenue, on 
the other hand, could substitute the revenues from the existing direct taxes by about 
5.5%. Similarly, the revenue from the output tax could replace existing indirect tax 
revenues up to 31%. In the case of sulfur tax, the revenue would replace revenue from the 
existing indirect taxes only by 8%. The difference in revenues between the output- and 
sulfur-taxes explains as to why gross output and total domestic demand are higher in the 
case of output tax than those in sulfur tax when tax revenues are recycled to finance cuts 
in existing indirect tax rates. 
  37Table 5: Revenues Generated from Different Tax Instruments under Alternative Revenue 
Recycling Schemes (Percentage of total government revenue)  
 
  Base   Simulation Cases with Alternative Schemes of 
 Case  Revenue  Recycling 
   Scheme-1  Scheme-2  Scheme-3 
Carbon tax revenue   
  New tax (i.e., carbon tax)  -  8.15 8.99 9.60
  Existing indirect tax  72.40 66.49 70.44 62.86
  Existing direct tax  26.45 24.24 19.39 26.39
Energy tax revenue   
  New tax (i.e., energy tax)  -  10.17 11.48 12.44
  Existing indirect tax  72.40 65.06 69.95 60.08
  Existing direct tax  26.45 23.66 17.38 26.34
Output tax revenue   
  New tax (i.e., output tax)  -  19.39 25.01 31.47
  Existing indirect tax  72.40 58.41 67.27 41.12
  Existing direct tax  26.45 21.11 6.48 26.25
Sulphur tax revenue   
  New tax (i.e., sulphur tax)  -  6.70 7.28 7.74
  Existing indirect tax  72.40 67.56 70.65 64.84
  Existing direct tax  26.45 24.61 20.89 26.27
 
4.5 Impacts on Demand for Goods and Services 
 
The impacts of different tax instruments on total domestic-, intermediate-, final-, 
household- and capital goods-demand under alternative schemes of recycling tax revenue 
are presented in Figures 5(a) to (e). Total domestic demand is mainly influenced by the 
intermediate demand for each tax instruments and under each scheme of revenue 
recycling. The output tax would cause the highest reductions in total domestic-, 
intermediate-, final-, household- and capital good- demand under revenue recycling 
Scheme 1 and 2. This is followed by the energy tax.  
 
 
  38Figure 5: The impacts of carbon-, output-, energy- and sulphur taxes on demands 
















































































































































































































(e) Total demand for capital goods   
 
  39Under the revenue recycling Scheme 3, all tax instruments except sulfur tax would cause 
demand for capital goods higher than in the base case. This is because, the recycling of 
tax revenue to finance cuts in non-energy goods would cause capital goods (e.g., 
fabricated metal, electrical machinery, other manufacturing goods and metals) relatively 
cheaper than those under other revenue recycling schemes. Since, the total demand for 
capital goods are higher than that in the base case, total final demand for goods and 
services are also higher than that in the base case under the revenue recycling Scheme 3. 
Moreover, the final- and capital good demand are higher in the case of output tax than 
those in the cases of carbon and energy taxes due to higher tax revenue recycled in the 
former cases than those in the latter. 
 
4.6 Impacts on Foreign Trades 
The impacts of different tax instruments on imports, exports and trade balance 
under alternative revenue recycling schemes are presented in Figure 6 (a) to (c). As can 
be seen from Figure 6 (a), total imports would decrease with each tax instrument 
considered here under revenue recycling schemes 1 and 2. As imports is mainly 
influenced by total domestic demand, the impacts of all tax instruments on imports are 
similar to those on total domestic demand under the tax revenue recycling schemes 1 and 
2. Output tax would cause the highest reductions in imports, whereas the sulfur tax would 
cause the lowest. The results under revenue recycling Scheme 3 are different than those 
in the other schemes. The output tax with tax revenue recycling Scheme 3 would cause 
import to increase. This is because the gross output is lower than that in the base case and 
the total domestic demand for goods and services is almost at the same level as in the 
  40base case. This implies domestic production is not enough to meet the total domestic 
demand and hence causing an increase in imports.  
 
































































































































(c) Trade balance 
 
The tax instruments are found to increase exports under revenue recycling 
Schemes 1 to 2, and decrease under the revenue recycling Scheme 3.
14 As in the case of 
                                                            
14 Under the revenue recycling Schemes 1 and 2 export prices of goods decrease due to an environmental 
tax thereby causing an increased demand for exports; the opposite would be the case under revenue 
recycling Scheme 3. 
  41imports, output and energy taxes have higher impacts on exports as compared to carbon 
and sulfur taxes. Trade balance would decrease in the case of all tax instruments under 
revenue recycling Schemes 1 to 2, whereas opposite would be the case under Scheme 3. 
 
5.  IMPACTS ON SO2 AND NOX EMISSIONS 
 
The impacts of different tax instruments on SO2 and NOx emissions under 
alternative revenue recycling schemes are presented in Table 6. As can be seen from the 
table, there are two interesting findings. First, different tax instruments for reducing the 
same level of CO2 emission would have significantly different impacts on SO2 and NOx 
emissions. Secondly, for a given tax instrument, environmental impacts (i.e., impacts on 
SO2 and NOx) do not vary significantly across alternative revenue recycling schemes. 
 
Table 6 
Impacts of environmental taxes on SO2 and NOx emissions under alternative revenue 
recycling schemes (% change from the base case) 
  Scheme 1  Scheme 2  Scheme 3 
SO2 Emission 
  Carbon tax  -13.42 -13.48 -13.79 
  Output tax  -11.50 -11.56 -12.17 
  Energy tax  -12.14 -12.17 -12.48 
  Sulphur tax  -20.20 -20.43 -20.86 
NOx Emission 
  Carbon tax  -10.06 -10.07 -10.01 
  Output tax  -8.90 -8.79 -8.48 
  Energy tax  -9.80 -9.80 -9.71 
  Sulphur tax  -10.39 -10.43 -10.42 
 
The output tax aiming to reduce CO2 emission by 10% would reduce SO2 and 
NOx emissions by about 12% and 9% respectively. On the other hand, the sulphur tax 
introduced for the same purpose (i.e., to reduce CO2 emission by 10%) would reduce SO2 
  42and NOx emissions by about 21% and 10% respectively. In terms of environmental 
impacts, the sulphur tax would be the best tax instrument in Thailand, as it would cause 
higher SO2 and NOx emission reductions than other tax instruments under each of the 
revenue-recycling scheme considered.  
For a given tax instrument, percentage reductions in emissions (i.e., SO2 and NOx) 
are not found varying significantly across the revenue recycling schemes. For example, 
the energy tax would reduce SO2 emission by 12.14% when tax revenue is recycled to 
households through a lump-sum transfer. The corresponding reductions would be 12.48% 
if revenue is recycled to finance cuts in existing indirect tax rates of non-energy goods.  
 
6. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
Since the difference in percentage welfare impacts between carbon and sulphur tax 
cases is very small (i.e., 0.01%), particularly when tax revenue is recycled to households 
as a lump-sum transfer and when the tax revenue is used to finance cuts in labour tax 
rates, sensitivity analysis is necessary. As there are more than 180 elasticity parameters 
used in the study, the number of possible sensitivity analyses could be too large. Hence, 
only selected parameters were considered for sensitivity analysis. 
In the nested structure of production or household utility function, the elasticities at 
the higher tiers may have larger effects than that at lower tires. Therefore, the sensitivity 
analyses are conducted on the elasticities of substitution at the highest tier of the 
production and the household sectors (i.e., elasticities of substitution between the primary 
factor composite and the aggregate intermediate input,σ
PFZ and elasticities of substitution 
between the capital-fuel composite and the labour-material-electricity composite, 
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KFLMEL). In the sensitivity analysis, the values of σ
PFZ and σ
KFLMEL are increased by 
50%. The results from this sensitivity analysis show that the ranking of the tax 
instruments in terms of their welfare effects would not alter (please see Table 7).  
Table 7 
Results of sensitivity analyses  
(% change in economic welfare from the base case) 
  Carbon tax  Sulphur tax Energy tax  Output tax 
50% increase in elasticity of substitutions at the highest level of nested structure 
(i.e., σ
PFZ and σ
KFLMEL are increased by 50%) 
Scheme 1  -1.41 -1.35 -1.83 -3.63 
Scheme 2  -1.27 -1.28 -1.67 -3.48 
Scheme 3  -0.09 -0.28 -0.22 -0.46 







CG are increased by 100%) 
Scheme 1  -0.59 -0.56 -1.00 -2.69 
Scheme 2  -0.54 -0.55 -0.97 -2.63 
Scheme 3  -0.04 -0.19 -0.14 -0.62 







CG are decreased by 25%) 
Scheme 1  -0.93 -0.96 -1.81 -2.41 
Scheme 2  -0.89 -0.93 -1.15 -2.35 
Scheme 3  -0.08 -0.28 -0.16 -0.38 
100% increase in trade elasticities (i.e., σ
DM and η are increased by 100%) 
Scheme 1  -0.46 -0.45 -0.60 -1.30 
Scheme 2  -0.43 -0.44 -0.57 -1.25 
Scheme 3  -0.19 -0.26 -0.27 -0.40 
 
Assuming that the impacts of carbon-, sulphur- and energy-tax instruments could 
be influenced by the elasticity of substitution between energy commodities (i.e., between 
fossil fuels, between electricity and fossil fuels), all the energy substitution elasticities 
considered in the study are increased by 100%. The energy substitution elasticities 





CG); elasticity of substitution between the fuel 
aggregate and electricity (i.e., σ
FEL) and elasticity of substitution of between fuel 
commodities (i.e., σ
FF). The results of this sensitivity analysis also indicate that the 
  44ranking of the tax instrument remain intact.  
 







FF) by 25%. This sensitivity analysis is 
particularly interesting as it could indicate whether or not superiority of sulphur tax over 
the carbon tax to reduce carbon emission holds. Interestingly, we found that the result 
does not hold, as the welfare loss of sulphur tax is higher (-0.96%) than that of carbon tax 
(-0.93%). This result indicates that a sulphur tax may not be efficient as compared to 
carbon tax to reduce CO2 emission if the substitution possibilities between the high 
sulphur content fuels (e.g., coal) and low sulphur content fuel (e.g., natural gas) is small. 
In reality, as discussed earlier in Section 4.2, the substitution possibility between coal and 
natural gas is high in Thailand even in the short-run.  
Finally, the trade elasticities (i.e., Armington elasticity, σ
DM and price elasticity of 
exports, η) are increased by 100%. In this sensitivity analysis too, the ranking of the tax 
instruments does not change (please see Table 7). 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL REMARKS 
 
This study analyzed the effectiveness of carbon-, sulphur-, energy- and output- 
taxes for CO2 emission reduction under different schemes of recycling the tax revenues in 
the case of Thailand. A key finding of the study is that the selection between carbon- and 
sulphur- tax in order to reduce CO2 emission depends on schemes for recycling tax 
revenues to the economy. The study shows that, in Thailand, a sulphur tax would be more 
  45effective to reduce CO2 emission when the tax revenues are recycled to households 
through a lump-sum transfer for two reasons. First, the sulphur tax designed to reduce 
10% of CO2 emissions from the base case, would also result in 20% reductions of SO2 
emissions. Secondly, the sulphur tax would cause lower welfare loss than a carbon tax if 
there exists a substitution possibility between high sulphur content fuel (coal) and 
negligible sulphur content fuel (e.g., natural gas) in the short run. If the tax revenue were 
to recycle to households through a lump sum transfer, a SO2 tax could be a policy choice 
in a country like Thailand, which does not have binding obligation to reduce CO2 
emission but has been seriously affected by SO2 emission. 
Another finding of the study is that if tax revenues are recycled to finance cuts in 
either labour tax rate or indirect tax rates on non-energy goods, carbon tax would be more 
efficient than sulphur-, energy- and output-taxes for CO2 emission reductions. The output 
tax is found to be the most costly (i.e., in welfare terms) among the alternative tax 
instruments considered here under each of the tax revenue recycling schemes although it 
generates two to three times higher revenue than the other tax instruments. 
While the finding that the output tax is the most inefficient among the tax 
instruments considered could be a generic one, the result that shows a sulphur tax is more 
efficient than a carbon tax to reduce CO2 emission could be case specific. This would be 
true in the economy, where sulphur control technologies are not in use, where low quality 
coal (i.e., lignite) is one of the main sources of energy supply and where possibility of 
substitution between high sulphur content fuel (coal) and low sulphur content fuel 
(natural gas) is high even in the short run. 
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